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NOTES
GIVING STRENGTH TO THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE:
ACCOMMODATION TO ALLOW FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS
I.

Introduction

After eight years of controversy over its appropriateness, Sinclair Refining

Co. v. Atkinson' has been overruled by the United States Supreme Court. The
case utilized to reconsider the continuing validity of Sinclair was Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770.2 Both of the cases dealt with the power of the
federal courts to issue an injunction to enforce no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. Such a power had been denied to the federal courts in
Sinclair. Boys Markets, in overruling Sinclair, allowed a federal injunction where
there was a no-strike clause violation and arbitration procedures were present
in the labor contract.
Mr. Justice Stewart, who had been a member of the majority in Sinclair,
joined in the Boys Markets decision. In a concurring opinion, he joined the
Court in concluding "That Sinclairwas erroneously decided and that subsequent
events have undermined its continuing validity. .

. ."

In stating his reasons for

this change of view Justice Stewart quoted Mr. Justice Frankfurter: ' "Wisdom
too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes
late."5
II. Background of the Dispute
The events leading up to the Boys Markets decision can be seen by tracing
the use of labor injunctions as they have evolved over the past century. Starting
in the latter part of the 19th Century and continuing through the 1920's, the
labor injunction was used by the courts to limit and control labor activities. 6
As early as 1896 the practice of securing labor injunctions was denounced politically as "Government by injunction."' Labor continued to gain strength, and
more and more agitation developed against the use of labor injunctions. The
courts, however, remained preoccupied with the common law emphasis on
individual interests and property rights.' Conduct which interfered with business
relationships was felt to be unlawful, and since most union activity did interfere
with business relationships it was subject to ex parte injunction by the employer.
There were no legislative guidelines for judges of the 1900's in the injunction
area. They therefore tended to decide cases according to their conservative social
1 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The decision was rendered on June 1, 1970.
3 Id. at 255.
4 Justice Frankfurter's statement was originally made in Henslee v. Union Planters Bank,
335 U.S. 595, 600 (dissenting opinion).
5 398 U.S. at 255.
6 Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 292 (1963).

7

FRANKFURTER & GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930).

8 Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor
Contracts, 32 ALBANY L.REv. 303 (1968).
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and political views.' The judges were inclined to be more favorable to management, finding union activity to be a restraint of trade or a prima fade tort.'0
The "restraint of trade" concept was set forth legislatively in § 6 of the Clayton
Ac. " The prima fade tort was held by the courts to be present where there was
intentional injury caused by the use of economic power by the unions. Employers
maintained that the labor injunction was their only effective weapon in disputes
with labor. The unions attacked the labor injunction on the grounds that hearings were too short and one-sided, there were no set guidelines for the judges to
follow, and the issuance of restraining orders and preliminary injunctions could
keep labor from presenting its case to the public.' 2
Political and economic pressures mounted against the use of the labor injunction despite the employer insistence on its necessity."3 In March of 1932,
Congress reacted to this mounting pressure by passing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. '- The Senate report on the bill showed that concern over the loss of respect
for the judiciary was indeed a factor in the bill's passage.' s To alleviate this concern, § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the federal
courts jurisdic6
tion to issue injunctions against strikes and peaceful picketing.'
Since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Supreme Court has,
on occasion, limited the scope of the Act. One area of accommodation has been
in cases involving the Railway Labor Act. There the Court has partially
returned the injunctive power to the federal district courts. The Court held in
Brotherhood of RailroadTrainmen v. Chicago River and IndianaRailroad Co.' 8
that an injunction was proper in "minor disputes" over an existing contract. This
was believed necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment
Board to enforce a form of compulsory arbitration. The Norris-LaGuardia Act

9 See generally FRANKFURTER & GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1-46 (1930).
10 Id. at 24.
11 Oh. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
12 Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292, 294 (1963).
13 Id. at 297.
14 § 2, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
15 S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
16 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provides
in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;

17
18

(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
-the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 103 of this title.
§ 127, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1964).
353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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was controlling, however, in "major disputes."' 9 A "major dispute" was held to

0
include changes in a collective bargaining agreement affecting jobs, while a
"minor dispute" was held to include mere infractions or interpretations of the
sections of an existing agreement. 2
A further shift in federal attitudes towards labor unions was seen in the
Wagner Act of 193522 which, among other things, denied the employer use of
the yellow dog (anti-union) contract. This showed increased removal of federal
court jurisdiction in the area of employer-employee contracts. Since the Wagner
Act, the federal government had emphasized voluntary collective bargaining
contracts as the primary tool in labor-management relations. But an even larger
problem arose in trying to find a forum or a means to resolve conflicts which
stemmed from such collective bargaining contracts. Both sides often found
arbitration and breach of contract action ineffective. Injunctions were generally
unavailable with such exceptions as "minor" railway disputes due to the antiinjunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia.
2
In 1947, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act " in an attempt to further
its policy of supporting voluntary collective bargaining contracts. Section 301 of
that act allowed federal courts to decide suits between labor organizations and
24
Section 301
employers for violations of collective bargaining agreements.
25
controversy.
in
amount
the
or
citizenship
to
regard
without
applied
Until the time that § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, state courts
usually handled collective bargaining contract cases.2" One of the major problems,
however, was that unions were not suable entities in many states, thus leaving
many employers at an extreme disadvantage." This particular problem was
solved by § 301 (b) which made enforcement of labor contracts possible by both
sides in the federal courts.
Two of the major questions still left open by the Taft-Hartley Act concerning
§ 301 were: 1) could an employer be forced to abide by an arbitration clause
through a mandatory injunction? and 2) could federal courts issue injunctions
to enforce no-strike agreements?

19 See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 362 U.S.
330 (1960).
20 Id. at 341.
21 Id. See also Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 292, 31417 (1963).
22 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-68 (1964).
23 Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
24 The Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), provides in part:
(a) . .. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) . . . Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States ...
25 Id.
26 Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor
Contracts, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 303, 305 (1968).
27 Id.

[Vol. 46:526]

NOTES

III. Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause After Taft-Hartley
The problem of federal enforcement of an arbitration clause was reached
in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills. 8 In that case the Supreme Court held that
a union suit for specific performance of an arbitration dame could be enforced
by a mandatory injunction. It was stated that "... the substantive law to apply
in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws." 2 Section 301 was thus held to be more than
a jurisdictional section.
Lincoln Mills further stated that the agreement to arbitrate grievances was
the quid pro quo for the agreement not to strike." One side of the quid pro quo
-the agreement to arbitrate-was enforcible in the federal courts. The Court
did not answer the question as to whether the other side of the quid pro quo
-the agreement not to strike-was enforcible.
Judging from its legislative history, § 301 was meant to supplement the role
of the state courts.3 ' Suits brought under § 301 were to be subject to regular
legal channels. This was seen in the House Conference Report: "Once parties
have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract
should be left to the usual processes of the law... ."" Lincoln Mills appears to
have gone beyond this interpretation, however, since it forces federal law to
govern in this area:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. Cf.
Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104. But state law, if compatible with
the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that
will best effectuate the federal policy. See Board of Commissionersv. United
States, supra,at 351-352. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as
federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.33
The Court appears to believe that a uniform federal law to govern collective
bargaining agreements would further the purpose of § 301.
Since the Court in Lincoln Mills held that Norris-LaGuardia did not prevent
a decree of specific performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate," employers
were hopeful that the Court would find injunctions to enforce no-strike clauses
consistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court had stated in regard to
Norris-LaGuardia:
Though a literal reading might bring the dispute within the terms of the
Act... we see no justification in policy for restricting § 301 (a) to damage
suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act. 5
28 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
29 Id. at 456.
30 Id. at 455.
31 See generally Vols. 1 & 2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE IsTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT (1947 and 1948).
32 H.R. CONF. REP.No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1947).
33 353 U.S. at 457.
34 Id. at 458.
35 Id. To support this conclusion, Justice Douglas cited Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n,
300 U.S. 515 (1937) and Graham v. Bhd. of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237 (1949) as examples
of the similar accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act.
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Employers reasoned that if specific performance was available to one side of the
quid pro quo-the agreement to arbitrate-then it would be available to enforce
the other side-the agreement not to strike. This hopeful reasoning proved to be
short-lived.
In a series of 1960 cases, the Court began developing a federal labor policy.
The key to this was to be resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. This
series of cases came to be known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy."
The gravamen of these decisions is the Court's belief that labor arbitration is a commendable form of self-government within industry and it,
rather than economic warfare, should be employed 3to7 settle disputes during
the duration of the collective bargaining agreement.
The power given to the arbitrator and the role of the court was seen in
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co. There it was stated:
In our role of developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, we think special
heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve.
See Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 468. The function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of
contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is
a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment,
when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance.38
The case involved action by a union to compel arbitration of an agreement.
The Trilogy left to the courts the task of deciding questions of contract.
The task of deciding the merits of grievances between labor and management
was left to the arbitrator. Thus "... the mandate of Norris-LaGuardia that federal courts not interfere in industrial disputes, a task for which they are concededly
ill-equipped, is preserved inviolate and extended to the arbitration process."3 9
In two 1962 cases4" the Court considered the continuing jurisdiction of state
courts in suits concerning violation of collective bargaining agreements. In
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney," it was decided that the state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 suits with federal courts." The court stated:

36 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
37 Bakaly and Pepe, And After AVCO, 20 LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1969).
38 363 U.S. at 567-68.
39 Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to
AVCO and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. Rav. 32, 38 (1969).
40 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) and Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
41 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
42 Id. at 508.
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The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of § 301 (a) was
not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement of
contracts made by labor organizations. Moreover, there is explicit evidence
that Congress expressly intended not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts.43
In the second state jurisdiction case, Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co.," the Court held that state law must give way to federal substantive law."5
Furthermore, a strike, if it is, used where arbitration had been agreed to by both
parties for final settlement of disputes, is a violation of the arbitration agreement
-even where a no-strike clause is not present. 4 6 The 8-1 decision in Lucas Flour
affirmed a state court's decision granting damages to an employer for a union's
47
breach of its no-strike clause.
The Lucas Flour Court emphasized the need for uniformity between state
and federal courts in the area of labor contract law by stating:
The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of
federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.
Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be
formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in
suits of a kind covered
by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of
48
federal labor policy.
The unanswered question from Lincoln Mills of whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act prohibited the federal courts from issuing injunctions in cases
involving violation of no-strike clauses was brought forth in Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson.49 In Sinclair an employer brought a suit in federal district court
under § 301 to enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance where a no-strike
clause was present. The Court held, with three judges dissenting,5" that a federal
injunction against a no-strike clause violation was barred by § 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.5" The Court stated that since the case involved a "labor dispute"
it came within the proscriptions of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.5"
If Congress had intended that § 301 suits should also not be subject to the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it certainly seems
likely that it would have made its intent known in this same express manner. 5
In making its decision, the Court distinguished Chicago River,"' Lincoln
43 Id. at 508-09.

44 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
45 Id. at 104.
46 Id. at 104-06.
47 Id. at 106.
48 Id. at 103.
49 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
50 Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not

participate. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and Harlan joined, dissented in
a separate opinion.
51 370 U.S. at 203.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 204.
54 Id. at 211.
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Mills 5 5 and the Steelworkers' Trilogy." The majority also looked to the legislative
history of § 301. 5 7 It found that a repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in § 301
had been expressly deleted by the joint conference committee between the Senate
and the House of Representatives."
Justice Brennan wrote a strong dissent:
Of course § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not, for purposes of actions
brought under it, "repeal" § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But the two
provisions do coexist, and it is clear beyond dispute that they apply to the
case before us in apparently conflicting senses. Our duty, therefore, is to
seek out that accommodation which will give the fullest possible effect to the
central purposes of both.5 9
Thus, Justice Brennan advocated an accommodation similar to the one between
the Railway Labor Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. He noted the following
quotation from Chicago River: "There must be an accommodation of that statute
and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each
is preserved."6
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusions as to the legislative
history and stated:
The legislative history of § 301 affords the Court no refuge from the
compelling effect of our prior decisions. That history shows that Congress
considered and rejected "the advisability of repealing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act insofar as suits based upon breach of collective bargaining agreements
are concerned. . .

."

But congressional rejection of outright repeal certainly

does not imply hostility to an attempt by the courts to accommodate all
statutes pertinent to the decision of cases before them. 61
Finally, Justice Brennan noted that an injunction could not issue in § 301
cases unless the Court decided that such relief was proper, despite NorrisLaGuardia.62 Thus:
When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which
both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may
issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that
effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his
obtaining an injunction against the strike.63
Justice Brennan felt that the power to enjoin a strike was "... essential to the
uncrippled performance of the Court's function under § 301.2' 64
After Sinclair, employers began to look to the state courts for injunctive
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 215-16.
Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957).
370 U.S. at 220. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 228.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 216-17. (Footnote omitted.)
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relief from no-strike clause violations.65 Where a restraining order was proper,
the state courts usually issued it as was done in the leading state case of McCarroll
v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters.6 In this case the employer
sued the union for violating a no-strike clause and obtained an injunction against
the strike. In upholding the decision, Justice Traynor, writing for the majority
on the California Supreme Court, stated:
The principal purpose of Section 301 was to facilitate the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements by making unions suable as entities in the
federal courts, and thereby to remedy the one-sided character of existing
labor legislation ....
We would give altogether too ironic a twist to this
purpose if we held that the actual effect of the legislation was to abolish in
state courts equitable remedies that had been available, and leave an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement of his
contract than he was before the enactment of Section 301.67
To avoid the effect of such state action and to take advantage of Sinclair's proscriptions, unions began to remove state cases to the federal courts.
The most important unanswered question of Sinclair was whether the antiinjunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia were now to be considered part of the
federal labor law. If so, then Lincoln Mills would have required that the antiinjunction provisions apply to state as well as federal courts.6" State courts rejected this view, however, and employers sought to keep injunctive actions in
state courts.69 The employers were hopeful that these state court actions would
not be removed since federal courts had no jurisdiction to issue injunctions.
The reason for not combining injunctive actions with ones for damages was that
federal courts had original jurisdiction over the damages question. 7 Thus, there
could be removal by federal courts of an action which included a request for
damages.
The view that removal would be denied because of lack of original jurisdiction where only an injunction was sought was seen in American Dredging '.
Local 25, Marine.7 2 In this case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a no-strike clause action was not within the original jurisdiction of federal courts
since the action was founded "solely on a state-created right to bring suit for
violation of a collective bargaining agreement and sought only a remedy available
under state law ...."7'
The American Dredging case, however, did not have the unanimous support
65 Bakaly and Pepe, And After AVCO, 20 LAB. L.J. 67, 70 (1969).
66 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
67 Id. at 63-64, 315 P.2d at 332.
68 Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to
AVCO and Beyond, 15 ViLL. L. REv. 32, 44 (1969).
69 Id. at 45.
70 Id.
71 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) states:
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. 72 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
73 Id. at 846.
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of the circuit courts.74 In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, I.A.M.,9' 5 for example,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that federal removal from state courts of
employer suits for injunctive relief of no-strike clause violations was proper. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Avco case and, on April 8, 1968, affirmed
the decision." Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court: "An action arising
under § 301 is controlled by federal substantive law even though it is brought
in a state court."77 Such an action was thus in the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Justice Douglas further commented:
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1337 says that, "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any act of
Congress regulating Commerce...."
It is that original jurisdiction that a
78
§ 301 action invokes.
The Court did not, however, decide whether remedies available in state
courts are limited to federal law remedies." It also left undecided whether
Sinclair required dissolution of a removed state court injunction." On the issue
of federal removability, American Dredging was overruled.
Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Brennan then wrote a concurring opinion on
the Avco case. In it they said: "The Court will, no doubt, have an opportunity
to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair upon an appropriate
future occasion.""1 These Justices seemed to be saying that the Court might be
willing to reconsider its holding that § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia barred injunctions
by federal courts under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2
Since the Sinclair decision, various attempts, all unsuccessful, were made in
Congress to include a provision in § 301 repealing the anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.83 These attempts were quelled despite the adoption
of a resolution in 1963 by the Section of Labor Law of the American Bar Association which called for Congress to remedy the alleged defects in the Sinclair
decision. 4
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
on the
83
Cong.,
S.

84

See Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966).
376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, I.A.M., 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
Id. at 560. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 560 n.2.
Id. at 561 n.4.
Id. at 562.
Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and PhiladelphiaMarine
Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 980, 996 (1969).
See H.R. REP. No. 12127, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. REP. No. 6080, 89th
1st Sess. (1965); and S. REP. No. 2455, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
REP. No. 2455, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) stated:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 4 of the Act entitled "An Act to amend
the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity,
and for other purposes," approved March 23, 1932 (47 Stat. 70; 29 U.S.C. 104), is
amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof a colon and the following:
"Provided, That nothing contained in this section or in section 8 shall be deemed to
deny jurisdiction or prohibit the granting of injunctive relief, where otherwise appropriate, after notice and hearing, where the relief sought is to enjoin the breach of a
clause, contained in a contract between an employer and a labor organization, forbidding a strike, slowdown, sitdown, or other interference with production, or a lockout."
ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS 226 (1963)

provided:

NOTES
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IV. Boys Markets-Enforcement of the No-Strike Clause
The reconsideration of the scope and continuing validity of the Sinclair
opinion occurred in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770.5 The dispute
arose on February 18, 1969, when the union objected to employees from outside
the union being used in the frozen foods area of the employees Cudahy, California, store.8" A strike, work stoppage, and picket line resulted from the disagreement.
At the time of the disagreement the union and the employer were parties to
a written collective bargaining contract known as the "Retail Food, Bakery,
Candy and General Merchandise Agreement, April 1, 1964-March 31, 1969."'
Besides providing for the wages, hours, benefits, and working conditions for the
employer's retail clerks, the contract required arbitration of disputes between the
union and the employer.8" In consideration for the agreement by the employer to
arbitrate all grievances, the union gave a no-strike agreement stating that "During
the term of this agreement, there shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, lockout, picketing or boycotts .... ."89 The union also promised that matters subject
to arbitration "shall be settled and resolved in the manner provided herein....
.""
The employer in this case was a California corporation operating a chain of
food supermarkets in southern California. After the strike had started, a representative of the employer immediately notified the union of the dispute, demanded
that the strike, work stoppage, and picket line be terminated, and invoked the
arbitration provision of the contract.91 The union, however, continued the strike,
work stoppage, and picketing. 2
On February 19, 1969, the employer filed suit with the California Superior
Court, asking that the union be enjoined from picketing, engaging in a strike, or
concerted work stoppage in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The state court granted the requested injunction,94 and thereupon the union
removed the action to the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and filed a motion to quash the state court order.95 In direct opposition to this motion, the employer then filed a motion for an order compelling
RESOLVED that in view of the recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Sinclair Refining Company v. Atkinson the section on labor relations law
of the American Bar Association urgently recommends that Congress enact a modification to Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to permit the issuance of a restraining
order, temporary or permanent injunction by a Court of the United States in any
action brought therein pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, as amended, for the purpose of filling the inequitable gap which exists
in the law relating to the mutual enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as
provided by the Congress under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947, as amended.
85 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
86 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
87 Id. at 3.

88 Id. at 3-4.
89 Id. at 4.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 5.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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arbitration, an order requiring specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate,
and an application for a preliminary injunction."
The district court granted the employer an Order Compelling Arbitration
and an Order for Injunction on March 12, 1969." Court findings indicated that
the dispute was one for arbitration under the collective bargaining contract and
enjoined the union from violating its no-strike pledge.
Once again the union appealed; this time to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.9 8 The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding on
September 26, 1969 that Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson was nearly the same
situation as existed in this case, and that it was thus bound by the Sinclair
holding.9" On January 12, 1970, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
00
case.
A number of amicus curiae briefs were then filed in the case. The American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations filed an amicus
brief in support of the respondent, Retail Clerks Union Local 770. This brief
argued that Sinclair should rule under the doctrine of stare decisis."'0 It stated
that "quickie" arbitration0 2 procedures showed that problems in the area were
Even further, it noted that such reliance
being solved by the parties themselves.'
on quick arbitration to solve disputes: ". . . confirms the wisdom of the devotion
to Congressional intent demonstrated by this Court in Sinclair."'0 °
On the side of the petitioner, Boys Markets, Inc., amicus briefs were filed by
the Associated Industries of New York State. Inc. and the Plumbing-Heating and
Piping Employers Council of Southern California, Inc. The brief for the Associated Industries of New York argued in part that:
The only way to achieve equality of employer and union in regard to the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements is to make such contracts
binding and enforceable on both parties. This may be achieved by allowing
employers in a proper case to apply to District Court for an injunction
temporarily enjoining a union strike in violation of a collective bargaining
contract containing a no-strike clause.' 0 5
The brief of the Plumbing-Heating and Piping Employers Council of Southern
California dealt with the role of the state court in Boys Markets. It advocated
that federal courts let state court injunctions stand.' 08 Justice Traynor's opinion
96 Id. at 6.
97 Id.
98 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1969).
99 Id. at 369.
100 396 U. S. 1000 (1970).
101 Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as
Amicus Curiae at 2, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) [hereinafter American Federation Brief].
102 See New Orleans S.S. Assn. v. ILA Local 1417, 389 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828.
103 Brief at 6.
104 Id.
105 Brief for the Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 5,
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
106 Amicus Curiae of the Plumbing-Heating and Piping Empoyers Council of Southern
California, Inc. at 10-11, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
[hereinafter Plumbing-Heating Brief].
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from McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council'

was quoted in this brief

as follows:
Finally, there is no invariable requirement, implicit in the federal system,
that a state court enforcing a federal right must not go beyond the remedies
available in a federal court. Uniformity in the determination of the substantive federal right itself is no doubt a necessity, but such uniformity is
not threatened
because a state court can give a more complete and effective
08
remedy.
Both the respondent's and the petitioner's briefs dealt with the major injunction problems in the case. The argument in the respondent's brief emphasized
its belief in the correctness of the Sinclair decision. It felt that no major difference
in factual situation existed between Sinclair and Boys Markets 0 9 Overruling
Sinclair would tip the "... balance of collective bargaining obligations in favor
of the employers and against the unions and their members."" ° The brief continued:
Mutuality of remedy, whether before the arbitrator or the courts is
essential to the federally protected balance of collective bargaining. The
restoration of injunctive powers to the District Courts will again place labormanagement disputes primarily in the courts. Moreover, the decision of a
Federal judge, without the hearing of evidence, in granting or refusing to
grant an application for an injunction, will unfairly prejudice the nonprevailing party in the ensuing arbitration since its burden there will also
consist of seeking, in effect, the arbitral overruling of the District Court, the
very Court that may subsequently be requested to confirm, modify or vacate
the award. 1
The brief for the respondent further emphasized its belief that "accommodation" of § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
a legislative and not a judicial function. It was alleged that such an -"accommodation" actually amounted to judicially repealing § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act" 12

The petitioner's brief placed much reliance upon the national labor policy
called for in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills."3 It was argued that the
prohibition against granting injunctions to uphold no-strike clauses was a serious
flaw in this federal labor policy." 4 Enforcement of the arbitration agreement was
allowable, but enforcement of its quid pro quo-the covenant not to strike-was
denied by Sinclair. "Without injunctive relief, the promise not to strike becomes,
as a practical matter, meaningless."" ' 5 Petitioner argued that Avco barely left a
107 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
108 Plumbing-Heating Brief at 10.
109 Brief for Respondent at 4, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).

110 Id. at 15.

111 Id. at 16-17.
112 Id. at 4.
113 353 U.s.-448 (1957).
114 Brief for Petitioner at 7.
115 Id.
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remedy for the employer faced with strikes in breach of contract. 1 6 Whenever a
state court issued an injunction, the union would probably remove the action to
a federal court.
The legislative history of § 301, relied on extensively in the Sinclair decision,
was held by the petitioner to be ".... cloudy and imperfect upon the question of
the intent of Congress regarding the equitable powers of Courts under Section
301.""' Accommodation was urged in petitioner's brief to be both necessary
and proper in a case such as Boys Markets. Under both the Railway Labor Act
and anti-trust law cases,"" support was found for accommodation." 9
Since the district court in Boys Markets issued its own injunctive order, the
petitioner's brief stated that the case touched only upon the effect of § 301 on
the state injunction once removal was achieved 20 Petitioner thus left this issue to
be covered by amicus curiae.' 21
The Supreme Court decided Boys Markets on June 1, 1970,"' reversing
Sinclair Refining Company v.Atkinson. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion with
Justices Black and White giving dissenting opinions. Justice Marshall took no
part in the decision.
Justice Brennan's opinion was similar to his dissent in Sinclair. The opinion
said:
It is precisely because Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our
otherwise consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration and our efforts to
accommodate and harmonize this policy with those underlying the antiinjunction provisions of 2the Norris-LaGuardia Act that we believe Sinclair
should be reconsidered.
Lincoln Mills"4 pointed out the need for a federal labor law when it held
generally that "the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.""'
Speaking of this federal labor policy, the Court in Boys Markets stated:
[I]n light of developments subsequent to Sinclair, in particular our decision
in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), it has become clear
that the Sinclair decision does not further but rather
frustrates realization of
26
an important goal of our national labor policy.
The opinion answered the argument that action here belonged to Congress by
saying: "The Court has cautioned that '[i]t is at best treacherous to find in con-

116
117

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id. at 8.

See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
Brief for Petitioner at 29.
Id. at 35.
See Plumbing-Heating Brief.
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. at 241.
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Id. at 456.
398 U.S. at 241.
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gressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.' Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)."'"
The practical effect of Avco and Sinclair was to displace the jurisdiction of
the state courts. Due to Sinclair's federal anti-injunction standards, the unions
would quickly remove to the federal courts state injunction actions under 28
U.S.C. § 1441."28 The Court pointed out that this was contrary to Dowd Box,'29
where it was found that the congressional purpose of § 301(a) was to "supplement, and
not to encroach upon, the pre-existing jurisdiction of the state
30
courts."'

The Court did put limitations on the decision:
We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal
only with the situation in which a collective bargaining contract contains a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does it follow
from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of
course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance.' 3'
The principles set out in the dissenting opinion of Sinclair to be used by
district courts in determining whether or not to grant an injunction were adopted
by the Court. 3 1 These principles were:

A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant
injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that
the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it
is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate,
the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the
contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to
arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike.
Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of
an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equitywhether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened
and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable
injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from
the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance. 370 U.S.,
at 228.33

Justice Black stated in his dissent to the Boys Markets decision that Sinclair
had been properly decidedY.4 He believed that the power to give federal courts
injunctive jurisdiction was with Congress, and since Congress had not acted, the
Court should not act. " He noted that:
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The only "subsequent event" to which the Court can point is our
decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Court
must recognize that the holding of Avco is in no way inconsistent with
Sinclair. 36
In closing his dissent, Justice Black quoted the words of John Adams as seen in
the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: "The judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not
of men."" 7
Justice White dissented for the reasons given in the Sinclair majority
8
opinion."
Despite these dissents, the Sinclair holding was overruled by the Boys Markets
decision. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act were "accommodated." In the proper circumstances, a federal court can
now grant injunctions to stop violations of no-strike clauses.
V.

Boys Markets-Observations and Conclusions

Did Congress mean to accommodate § 4 of the Norris La-Guardia Act with
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act in order to give injunctive powers to the federal
courts in the collective bargaining area? The voluminous legislative history of
§ 301 is inconclusive on this question, yet the Court in Boys Markets has concluded that such an accommodation is proper and necessary.
An agreement to arbitrate in a collective bargaining contract is, as stated in
Lincoln Mills, enforceable by the federal courts. Lincoln Mills is silent, however,
as to the other side of the quid pro quo-the union's agreement not to strike
where a grievance is arbitrable. Boys Markets, in overruling Sinclair, held that
this agreement not to strike was also enforceable. It allowed the use of injunctions by the federal courts to halt strikes that arise in violation of collective
bargaining agreements. The employer can now seek an injunction to enforce
the no-strike clause, and the employee can now seek an injunction to enforce a
no-lockout agreement. As stated by the petitioner in Boys Markets:

§

Accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia with Section 301 would obviously
provide equal access to the judicial process by empoyers and labor organizations alike. Thus, a no-strike/arbitration agreement is invariably also a nolockout/arbitration agreement. Section 301 makes both sides of the cornmitment to arbitrate rather than to use economic force equally enforceable
by the courts. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962).9
"Quickie" arbitration was advocated as a better solution than the use of the
equitable injunction in the brief of the American Federation of Labor and
136 Id. at 260.
137 Id. at 261.
138 Id.
139 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970).
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Congress of Industrial Organizations."" The brief cited New Orleans Steamship
Association v. GeneralLongshore Workers I.L.A.' 1 -as an example of a "quickie"
arbitration providing effective relief for an employer. "Quickie" arbitration alone,
however, is not the answer. Such arbitrations are not necessarily quick, and thus
are not necessarily effective relief for an employer. The case of New Orleans
Steamship is a good example. The hearing in that case began on October 8, 1965,
and the arbitrator's award was not given until December 13, 1965.142 To an
employer faced with a strike, a two-month period is anything but "quick."
An additional observation concerning Congressional inaction should be given
here. Justice Black, in his Boys Markets dissent, pointed to the failure of Congress
to change § 301 after the Sinclairdecision as an indication that Sinclairshould be
reaffirmed.' 43 The opinion in Boys Markets noted that this does not necessarily
follow: "the mere silence of Congress is not a sufficient reason for refusing to
reconsider the decision."' 4 4 Failure of Congress to act in an area requiring definition militates for court action. If the Boys Markets case has given injunctions
where Congress feels they are not proper, Congress can pass legislation to change
the situation.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the Boys Markets decision dealt only
with the collective bargaining contract and alleged contractual violations. This
is in keeping with the Steelworkers' Trilogy doctrine of leaving contract decisions
to the court and giving the task of deciding the merits of grievances to the
arbitrator. If there is no enforcement available for the various clauses in a contract, then there is less reason for the parties to want a formal agreement. To
encourage arbitration the courts must encourage collective bargaining agreements
and the enforcement of such agreements.
The Boys Markets decision, therefore is an affirmative step in the creation of
a federal labor policy. Encouragement of arbitration to solve collective bargaining
contract disputes is for the public good whereas economic warfare in the form
of strikes, lockouts, and work stoppages hurts the nation's economy. Arbitration,
in many cases, allows for settlement of disputes without these detrimental battles
between labor and management, and enforcement of a union's promise not to
strike makes the promise to arbitrate the underlying dispute meaningful.
Randall L. Stamper
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